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Lucas Paradox in The Long Run 
Abstract   
This paper investigates international capital flows to developing countries for the period 1970-2006. The study 
focuses on the empirical puzzle that although one would expect international capital to flow to capital scarce 
countries where returns are higher, observation shows that capital flows to richer rather than to poorer countries 
(the Lucas paradox). To explore this, total capital is measured as the sum of foreign direct investment and 
portfolio equity flows. The paper addresses the argument, based on cross-section evidence (Alfaro et al., 2008, 
Rev. Econ. Stats), that including the quality of institutions accounts for the paradox (because richer countries 
have better institutions they attract more capital) and finds that this only holds if developed countries are 
included; within developing countries, institutions do not account for the paradox. Hence, for a consistent 
sample of 47 developing countries the positive wealth bias in international capital flows or the Lucas paradox is 
shown to be a persistent phenomenon in the long run.     
Keywords: Capital flows, Lucas paradox, Institutional quality, Economic growth, Cross-section OLS, Long-run 
JEL classification: E02, E13, F21, F41, J24, O16 
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1 Introduction 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) include limited international capital mobility as one of the six major puzzles in 
international macroeconomics. The stickiness in cross border capital transfers was first documented by Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980) who found very high correlations between domestic savings and investments in OECD 
countries for the 1960-1974 period. Since incremental savings tend to stay in the country making the savings it 
is hard to assert that foreign capital has been perfectly mobile. Using the self-financing ratio of cumulative 
discounted gross national savings and gross national investment, Aizenman et al. (2007) demonstrated that 90 
percent of domestic capital stock, on average, in developing countries is self-financed and this fraction was 
stable during the 1990s.  
Under homogeneous technology with constant returns to scale, identical goods, and competitively free 
international trade, conventional neoclassical growth and trade theory predicts that factor price equalizing 
(Samuelson, 1948) investments will accrue to the capital scarce less developed economies, i.e. capital will tend 
to flow to poorer countries. Via this mechanism international convergence in economic growth and consumption 
would be accomplished in a transition period during which cross-country differences in levels of economic 
development will fade away. This has evidently not happened.  
The Lucas paradox refers to the observation of rich-to-poor capital flows falling far short of the flows 
predicted by the neoclassical growth and trade theory, as systematically observed in Lucas (1990). In fact, 
capital flows tend to move disproportionately to richer countries, if not from poorer to richer countries. In the 
same vein and with reference to endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), King and Rebelo 
(1993) conclude that under such conventional assumptions about preferences it is hard to rely on the 
neoclassical model to explain sustained variations in growth rates across countries. Accounting for this paradox 
would also help explain the more general puzzle of relatively immobile international capital flows.  
Lucas (1990) provided four possible hypotheses to account for that puzzling patterns of international capital 
flows: differences in relative human capital stocks; variations in external benefits of human capital; capital 
market imperfections (political risk, institutions etc.); and restrictions on capital flows (taxation, capital controls 
and similar policies) and monopolistic power (Parente and Prescott, 1999) of either the imperial colonizer or of 
the national sovereign government. Reasoning that adjusting for human capital differentials eliminates the return 
differentials between poorer and wealthier countries, he favours the combination of the first two explanations.  
Theoretical approaches to the Lucas paradox can be categorized into two major groups. Papers in the first 
group try to explain the puzzle through domestic economic fundamentals such as omitted factors of production, 
disruptive government policies in forms of taxation, direct controls and restrictions, institutional establishments 
(incentive and safeguard structures) and total factor productivity differences.1 International capital market 
imperfections constitute the conceptual stance on which the second approach favours asymmetric information 
and sovereign risk explanations.2 Both approaches are inevitably interlinked and some recent papers (e.g. 
Goldstein and Razin, 2006; Kraay et al., 2005) take a mixed position between fundamentals and financial 
market inefficiencies in modelling private foreign equity and portfolio flows.  
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Although empirical literature focusing directly on the Lucas paradox is limited (e.g. Clemens and 
Williamson, 2004, Alfaro et al., 2008), there is extensive applied work on the realization of capital flows. 
Financial and banking crises, capital flight, and rapid capital flow resumptions stimulated economists to analyse 
the main determinants and properties of flows through empirical research. Some studies have concentrated on 
the topic of whether external financing is driven by domestic or foreign factors—the push versus pull 
controversy.3 Time series properties of cross border fund movements have also been analyzed.4 Other papers 
have provided evidence on compositional dynamics and differentiation of various types of financial transfers 
according to their build-up and determination.5   
Specifically for institutions, several studies document that institutional quality is important in explaining 
capital flows. Employing world governance indicators of the World Bank as proxy for institutions Faria and 
Mauro (2009) find that institutional quality index is positively significant in explaining the share of direct and 
portfolio equity stocks in total external liabilities. De Santis and Lührmann (2009) show the negative impact of 
deteriorating civil liberties on income scaled foreign portfolio equity flows. Daude and Fratzscher (2008) 
demonstrate that component based institutional quality in terms of corruption, expropriation risk, repudiation 
costs, and days of enforcement for business contracts has differing influence on capital stock compositions. 
Institutions, for instance, have not been detected to be effective on FDI unlike the situation for international 
portfolio equity investments. Edison and Warnock (2008) could not discover any meaningful association 
between first differenced International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index and US net monthly 
purchases of emerging Asian and Latin American portfolio equity securities. 
Using cross-section data for countries from all income levels (both industrialized and unindustrialized), 
Alfaro et al. (2008) find that the problem of ‘lower-than expected capital flows to poorer economies’ (the Lucas 
paradox) is resolved by including a measure for institutional quality. For a sample of 47 developing countries 
over the 1970-2006 period, this study tests if their findings hold up when advanced countries—that consistently 
have higher levels of institutional quality—are excluded.6 Employing simple cross-section OLS estimators and 
using real capital flows (the sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity investment) per capita as the dependent 
variable (as in Alfaro et al., 2008), the paper provides evidence for the Lucas paradox within developing 
countries.7 Following Houthakker (1965), Baltagi and Griffin (1984), Pesaran and Smith (1995), we interpret 
the estimation results from cross-section OLS as capturing long-run relationships. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical background and Section 3 
specifies econometric methodology. Section 4 describes the data and overviews the evolution of selected data 
over time. Core regression results are given in Section 5 and concluding remarks are in Section 6.                    
2 Theoretical motivation 
We follow the expositions of Alfaro et al. (2008). In the context of economic growth, assume a small open 
economy operating with explicit production factors capital, , and labour, , through a constant returns to scale 
(CRS) production function of the form: 
 = F , 
∙
 > 0, ∙
 > 0;∙
 < 0, ∙
 < 0     (1) 
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where  represents output,  stands for total factor productivity (TFP), and  subscript denotes time. In such 
an open economy agents can lend and borrow capital globally. Hence, if all countries are endowed with identical 
technology with homogeneous capital and labour inputs the instantaneous convergence of the returns to capital 
would be accomplished via free and competitive international trade so as to get; 
f 
 =  = f          (2) 
where f∙
 denotes the net of depreciation production function in per capita terms and  refers to capital 
input per capita in country  or . Diminishing returns, identically endowed constant TFP, free and competitive 
trade, and international arbitrage imply that financial resources will move from capital-abundant countries of 
low returns to capital-scant countries of high returns. As noted, however, this is not observed; giving rise to the 
Lucas paradox. Theoretical approaches to account for this paradox can be categorized as cross country 
variations in economic fundamentals versus international capital market imperfections. 
2.1 Economic Fundamentals 
2.1.1 Omitted Factors of Production 
One conjecture is that the conventional neoclassical theory disregards other factors potentially influencing 
production. Natural resources and human capital (Lucas, 1990; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) may have 
positive externalities on productivity ultimately leading to increased returns to capital. Incorporating these 
factors under a new term, , yields 
 = F ,  , 
          (3) 
Thus, we now obtain the true returns equated as 
f  , 
 =  = f  ,         (4) 
The implication being that lower   reduces relative returns in poorer countries.  
2.1.2 Government Policies 
Fiscal policy by means of taxation, monetary policy via inflation targeting, and policies directly imposing 
capital controls may interrupt capital flows (Stockman and Hernández, 1988). The distortive effects of these 
government policies can be inserted into the model by supposing that governments levy tax on capital returns at 
varying rates of τ. The equivalent returns are given in the form of    
f 
1 − τ
 =  = f 1 − τ
       (5) 
2.1.3 Institutions and TFP 
Consisting of both culture shaped informal codes of conduct like social norms, customs, traditions, ethical and 
moral values; and formal rules such as laws, decrees, statutes, communiqués, and similar regulations institutions 
are the constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. Weak property rights, fear of 
expropriation, low enforcement of legal contracts, and other weak socio-political and socioeconomic conditions 
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due to poor institutions may leave productive capacities unexploited and may create a wedge between ex ante 
and ex post financial investment returns in that economy (Parente and Prescott, 1994).8 Being unable to 
explicitly distinguish among the reflections of heterogeneous incentive structure, innovation opportunities, and 
technological efficiency both TFP and institutional quality originated factors are attributed to. The return 
differentials are expressed as 
f 
 =  = f          (6) 
2.2 International Capital Market Imperfections 
2.2.1 Asymmetric Information 
Both national and international financial markets are subject to either adverse selection, moral hazard, costly 
state verification, or all of these to a certain extent. In general, laissez-faire market conditions may be paralyzed 
through the distortions caused by this sort of informational asymmetries among the participants. Furthermore, as 
Gertler and Rogoff (1990) notes, North-South capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed relative to the 
perfect-information benchmark. Eventually, the lack of international portfolio diversification and home bias can 
come into play in the forms of disinvestment, divestment, and under investment particularly in less developed 
poor countries (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996).  
2.2.2 Sovereign Risk 
Bearing an overlapping relationship with political risk and institutions, sovereign risk exclusively embraces 
credit risk, the probability that a sovereign will default on servicing its debt, as well as the risk of expropriation 
and repudiation. It also refers to the policies by which a government can discourage domestic residents in 
fulfilling their obligations to foreign contracts. In his recent theoretical paper Wright (2006) argues that due to 
default risk only smaller levels of capital flows can be supported in equilibrium. By means of the example of 
colonial India which was exposed to the same rules as imperial Great Britain, Lucas (1990) argued that 
sovereign risk could not solve his puzzle. Conversely, recalling several rebellions in India, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) maintained that sovereign risk might well account for the paradox: “As long as the odds of non-
repayment are as high as 65 percent for some low-income countries, credit risk seems like a far more compelling 
reason for the paucity of rich-poor capital flows.”  
3 Methodology 
The cross section ordinary least squares (OLS) specification for the long run averages over time can be 
characterized as: 
 = $ + & + '( + )            (7) 
where  is average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment per capita to country  = 1, 2, … , ,
, 
$ is a constant or the intercept,  is the log per capita initial wealth, ' is a 1 ×  − 1
 row vector of any 
additional covariates or control variables included sequentially either in a way of ‘one at a time’ or in a 
multivariate regression framework, and ) is the usual disturbance term. The coefficients of interest are & and 
 − 1
 × 1 column vector (, where  is the number of regressors and  ≥ 1. The former will be capturing 
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the presence of the Lucas paradox while the latter will be offering quantitative insight about the ability of 
corresponding regressor in accounting for, i.e. resolving, the paradox.  
4 Descriptive statistics and trends   
Alfaro et al. (2008) argued that it is more appropriate to use time averaged variables for elucidating the long run 
relationships. Figure 1 shows the trends of twelve components of the composite index for the quality of 
institutions. The scores of each component are the annual mean values across all sample countries for which the 
data are available. Because institutional quality is one of the core variables it has been conjectured that a 
breakdown of its components would demonstrate the profile of their time variation, thus giving an idea about the 
composite index too. Indeed, as can be seen from the figure all the components but four display a relatively 
stationary pattern and those four are mostly stable throughout the 1980s and since 2001. The coefficient of 
variation statistics of both per capita equity inflows and institutional quality averaged across counties are less 
than of those averaged across years.9 
[Figure 1] 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for time averaged cross section data on the main variables in our 
analysis. On average, a typical developing country attracts per capita foreign portfolio equity plus direct 
investment around $48. Ranging between $1 and $202 average capital flows per capita also has high variation 
across countries. With a mean value of 5.9 out of 10 the index of quality of institutions has the lowest cross 
country variation; a parallel and more pronounced less spatial (country) heterogeneity indication.  
[Table 1] 
In a slight contrast, average years of education attainment shows a wide array from about five months to 8 
years which demonstrates the disparity in human capital formation across unlucky developing countries. The 
negative mean growth rate of the most volatile variable of average total factor productivity might be a sign for 
declining efficiency in production processes and technologies of those countries. Finally, it is important to note 
that the mean value of the composite variable of restrictions on capital mobility (taking values between 0 and 1) 
reads as 0.60 which is well above 0.50. This reveals how strongly countries themselves de-jure constrain and 
control the flow of funds albeit all financial liberalizations they pass through and economic globalizations they 
become a part. 
5 The underlying regression results 
This section concentrates on the actual models fitted to the data by replicating key aspects of the analysis in 
Alfaro et al. (2008) first, laying down the estimation outputs in the subsequent tables for the sample of 
developing countries second, carrying out sensitivity checks third and finally dealing with potential endogeneity 
issues through instrumental variable regressions.     
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5.1 Replication of Alfaro et al. (2008) 
Using data for the same sample of 98 developed and developing countries, we first replicate the main estimates 
of Alfaro et al. (2008). Panel A in Table 2 provides the cross-section OLS regression results following the 
approach of the original paper.  
[Table 2] 
Models (1), (3) and (6) show that the Lucas paradox exists for both samples of countries from all income 
levels as the log per capita initial GDP (a proxy for the level of initial capital stock in an economy) is positively 
significant in explaining the inflow of new foreign capital. The inclusion of institutional quality ‘resolves’ the 
paradox in all models except (8) which, in contrast, demonstrates that the results for the original period 1970-
2000 are sensitive to base year adjustment. Nevertheless, our data reaffirm the findings of Alfaro et al. (2008) 
with the same base year. Panel B reports estimation results from the replications that consider slight 
modifications (e.g., extending the sample period to 2006, taking 2005 as the base year and additionally 
incorporating the ‘socioeconomic conditions’ component in the composite institutional quality variable). The 
estimates in this lower panel corroborate those of Alfaro et al. (2008) more strongly than the upper panel. 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we focus on the subset of developing countries and investigate the 
empirical implications of the Lucas paradox and related theories within that particular country group. More 
specifically, we explore if the above findings hold when industrialised (developed) countries are removed from 
the sample.                  
5.2 Central Cross-Section OLS Results 
Table 3 reports the main estimation results for the sample of developing countries. The preliminary cross section 
OLS regressions of per capita foreign portfolio equity and direct investment inflows on initial GDP and 
composite institutional quality index are given in the first three models.  
[Table 3] 
Model (1) in the table corroborates that the Lucas paradox indeed exists; i.e. capital moves to wealthier 
markets in contrast to the expectations of neoclassical growth and trade theory. Looking at Model (2), log initial 
GDP per capita remains significant. With an alternative income measure, Model (3) supports the previous model 
that quality of institutions is not able to resolve the paradox for a sample of only developing countries. The last 
three models in the same table portray additional and augmented multivariate estimation results. This part 
encompasses regressions testing all four hypotheses proposed by Lucas (1990). From these explanations Lucas 
(1990) had preferred the stock differences in and positive externalities of human capital interpretations over the 
remaining. Model (4) challenges this as the inclusion of average years of schooling as human capital proxy does 
not remove the paradox for developing countries. Similarly, Model (5) shows that initial GDP still preserves its 
statistical significance (at 10%) despite controlling for distance, restrictions on capital market transactions and 
years of schooling. With a slightly different initial wealth measure, Model (6) also corroborates the persistence 
of the paradox within developing economies.   
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To address potential endogeneity, cross feedback, and collinearity issues Figure 2 illustrates the conditional 
correlation plots between the residuals from core specifications. Panel A plots the data pointed residuals from 
the regression of average capital inflows on average institutional quality index against the residuals from the 
regression of log initial GDP again on institutional quality variable. Panel B, likewise, sketches the data pointed 
residuals from the regression of average equity investment on log initial GDP against the residuals from the 
regression of institutional quality on log GDP in 1970. It is clear that institutional quality abstracted initial GDP 
and initial GDP-free institutional quality are both positively related to capital flows, visualizing the persistence 
of the Lucas paradox within developing countries. 
[Figure 2] 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
A variety of alternative specifications and variable measures show our main results to be robust.10 Table 4 
provides six different models fitted. With the same periodic focus as in Table 3 and by controlling for additional 
proxies of economic fundamentals, each of the first mid three regressions substantiate that the quality of 
institutions does not fully answer the question; why does capital not flow to poorer countries? Meanwhile, all 
the parameters on those covariates carry expected signs despite some being insignificant. Model (5) switches 
initial wealth measure, the paradox proxy, from GDP to gross capital formation per capita (domestic capital 
stock) and verifies the settled outcomes of the second and third models in the previous table. The two remaining 
estimations, one on the far left and the other on the far right of the table, fit the data averaged over two different 
sub-periods without breaking the robustness of our key findings. 
[Table 4] 
Asymmetric information and sovereign risk explanations are considered in Table 5. Models from (1) to (3) 
testify that none of the additional covariates is significant and our basic results are insensitive to allowing for 
them. Specification (4) regresses average capital inflows over 1985-2006 on initial levels of institutional quality 
(in 1984). The positively significant impact of pre-sample institutions on the subsequent capital inflows wanes 
when per capita GDP in 1984 enters in the last model. This is just the opposite of the corresponding estimates in 
Alfaro et al. (2008).11       
[Table 5] 
5.4 Instrumental Variable Estimations 
Taking into account possible endogeneity of institutional quality variable because of different factors like 
measurement error and attenuation bias, we conduct instrumental variable (IV) estimations as the final stage of 
analysis. The index of institutional quality is sequentially instrumented by European settler mortality variable (in 
logs), British legal origin dummy, and the variable of English language.   
[Table 6] 
Under Model (1) in Table 6, negative significance of the settler mortality variable at the first stage regression 
(in Panel B) corroborates the assertion of Acemoglu et al. (2001) that if the European settlement was 
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discouraged by diseases or when they could not settle the colonizers created worse institutions. In Panel A under 
the same model, second stage regression of the two stage least squares (2SLS) indicates that the portion of the 
average institutional quality index that is explained by the log European settler mortality has a significantly 
positive impact on capital flows. Under (2B), however, log European settler mortality is no longer significant 
once initial income enters into the specification. And under (2A), neither log initial GDP nor is instrumented 
institutional quality statistically different from zero. Therefore, settler mortality appears to be an imperfect or 
weak instrument. Very large standard errors of the 2SLS estimates in 2A (see below) and specification-sensitive 
results support this surmise. Hence, we cannot assert that European settler mortality resolves our question (the 
Lucas paradox) despite its common use as an effective instrument for institutions in the literature.  
The last IV estimation is given under Model (3) where institutional quality is now instrumented by the 
British legal origin dummy and the English language variable. Extremely weak coefficient on log colonizer 
mortality verifies the excludability (strict exogeneity) of that variable. Moreover, the /-value of the Hansen J-
test of over-identifying restrictions ascertains that all instruments are valid. Contrary to our results, highly 
significant English language seems to be crucial in accounting for institutional differences across countries in 
Alfaro et al. (2008). This might be due to the fact that their sample contains currently advanced large countries 
like the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia which were the former British colonies. 
The IV (2SLS) estimator is less efficient (has larger standard errors) than OLS when the explanatory 
variables are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 527). Therefore it would be useful to test whether the 
institutional quality variable is in fact endogenous. One way to do this is to conduct a Hausman test to compare 
the IV and the OLS estimates. According to Hausman specification tests on the non-robust versions we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between IV and OLS are not systematic. Hence, 
endogeneity does not appear to be a critical problem. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper empirically examines whether the results of Alfaro et al. (2008) are robust to a sample that excludes 
developed countries. Using cross-section data averaged over the period 1970-2006 for up to 47 developing 
countries, it tests the sensitivity of the Lucas paradox to a measure for institutional quality, given control 
variables. We discover that, within developing economies, the puzzle of rich-to-poor capital flows persists, 
despite allowing for the quality of institutions, in the long-run. In most of the cross-section OLS estimations, the 
real per capita initial GDP (the paradox proxy) and the composite index of institutional quality have positive 
impacts on real capital inflows (the sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity inflows) per capita.  
Our analysis suggests that the approach of Alfaro et al. (2008) only appears to explain the Lucas paradox 
because of the driving effects of developed countries. Relative to developing countries, advanced countries 
attract higher volumes of capital inflows and have significantly higher institutional quality. These are supported 
by the larger variable variances across countries and very high correlations between main explanatory variables 
in their sample (Tables 1-4 in Alfaro et al., 2005). Another explanation for the persistence of the wealth bias 
(the Lucas paradox) within developing countries could be that either underdeveloped economies do not actually 
have higher returns or international investors and creditors are not satisfactorily convinced that they are higher.      
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Notes  
1. See Martin and Rey (2004), Razin and Yuen (1994), Gomme (1993), Tornell and Velasco (1992). 
2. See Albuquerque (2003), Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), Gertler and Rogoff (1990). 
3. See Calvo et al. (1993),  Fernández-Arias (1996), Chuhan et al. (1998), Taylor and Sarno (1997). 
4. Claessens et al. (1995), Sarno and Taylor (1999a, 1999b),  Levchenko and Mauro (2007).   
5. See, for instance, Lane (2004).  
6. The exclusion of some developing countries like those in the Eastern Europe is because of data 
unavailability especially for the period 1970-1990. There is no any explanation in Alfaro et al. (2008) on 
how they find ‘per capita GDP in 1970’ for some countries (like for example Azerbaijan) in their sample. 
7. It might be argued that taking Lucas (1990) as the main theoretical reference is not appropriate for such a 
study focusing on developing countries only, as Lucas (1990) makes developed versus developing or rich 
versus poor distinction by comparing rich US and poor India. This should be regarded as a specific case or 
just an example to make the point vivid however. Under the objectivity of science (Popper, 2005, who notes 
that scientific statements or theories must be inter-subjectively testable implying that from the theories 
which are to be tested other testable theories can be deduced.) it is more general and scientifically plausible 
to continuously differentiate countries or economies as poorer versus richer rather than splitting them into 
just two discrete groups as developed versus developing or rich versus poor. Moreover, developing 
countries are classified with respect to income, wealth or capital stock (e.g. low income, lower middle 
income and upper middle income) more commonly and often than developed counties. Such widespread 
classification implies sufficient heterogeneity among developing countries in terms of initial capital stocks 
which also justifies the appropriateness of the theoretical framework adopted in the study. 
8. See Acemoglu and Dell (2010), and Castro et al. (2004) for institutions; Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and 
Parente and Prescott (2000) for TFP differences. 
9. The within coefficient of variation is 0.65 for per capita equity flows, and 0.10 for institutional quality 
whereas the between coefficient of variation reads 1.40 for the former, and 0.11 for the latter.  
10. Outliers detecting added variable plots (available upon request) indicate that Chile and Panama may have 
influential observations. Our key results are left unaltered, however, when we drop either of them in turn or 
suppress both at once. 
11. For robustness purposes, taking the fifth model in Table 3 as benchmark, we also run the regressions 
involving real capital flows per capita as the dependent variable including debt and aid flows besides direct 
and portfolio equity flows under a more composite capital flow measure; and regressions containing real 
per capita capital flows as another dependent variable excluding only aid allocations. Alternatively we have 
incorporated population, savings and income growth under the same specification as Mankiw et al. (1992) 
suggests that those factors affect marginal product of capital according to their augmented Solow growth 
model. In addition to savings and growth, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) argue that the allocation puzzle in 
capital flows to developing countries is also related to the pattern of accumulation of international reserves. 
All of the reassurance checks with these alternative dependent and independent variables deliver results 
(available upon request) very similar to Model (5) of Table 3.     
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Figures 
Figure 1 Evolution of the Institutional Quality Index Components, 1984–2006 
 
Note: A higher score which is the average across 53 countries for each year implies lower risk for every component. 
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Figure 2 Conditional Correlation Plots of the Residuals 
 
 
 
Note: Panel A abstracts from the effects of institutional quality while Panel B does from those of log initial GDP in shaping the mutual 
associations in question. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average per capita equity flows, 1970-06 47 47.964 48.692 1.189 202.261 
Per capita GDP (PPP $US) in 1970 47 0.881 0.588 0.175 2.838 
Average institutional quality, 1984-06 47 5.901 0.688 4.539 7.238 
Average years of schooling, 1970-00 47 3.932 1.693 0.477 8.209 
Average distance, 1970-06 47 8.842 1.657 5.903 12.312 
Average capital mobility barriers, 1970-05 47 0.600 0.202 0.000 0.910 
Average corporate tax rate, 1999-06 36 29.872 5.422 15.000 38.240 
Average trade openness, 1970-06 47 63.162 31.823 16.924 155.182 
Average bank assets, 1970-06 46 0.344 0.198 0.118 0.990 
Average TFP growth, 1982-06 39 -0.277 1.448 -3.934 1.909 
Per capita GCF (2005 $US) in 1970 44 0.401 0.411 0.057 2.005 
Malaria contagion risk as of 1994 47 0.418 0.400 0.000 1.000 
Average country risk, OECD, 1999-06 47 5.145 1.582 2.000 7.000 
Average Int'l voice traffic, 1970-06 46 30.523 39.074 0.785 165.678 
Average foreign bank asset share, 1990-97 41 0.229 0.208 0.006 0.852 
Note: Though it may change as a result of data availability, the overall sample period is 1970-2006 in our case whereas it is either 1970-
2000 or 1970-1997 in Alfaro et al. (2008). All selected variables expressed as monetary values are either in current PPP $US or in 2005 
constant $US. Distance, gross capital formation (GCF), and GDP are in thousands of $US. Due to data unavailability, unlikely Alfaro et al. 
(2008), we used GCF rather than domestic capital stock and OECD’s country risk in lieu of Moody’s sovereign risk and international per 
person voice traffic instead of Reuters. Moreover, in their TFP growth calculation only capital input has been subtracted from the total 
output whereas in ours both capital and labour inputs deducted so as to yield more accurate TFP estimation. 
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Table 2 Replication of Core Specifications in Alfaro et al. (2008) 
A. 1970-2000 Period  
 Base Year 1996  Base Year 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Log per capita initial  
GDP (1996 PPP$) 
1.20*** 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(0.30) 
1.36*** 
(0.19) 
-0.08 
(0.43) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log per capita initial  
GDP (2005 PPP$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.39*** 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.27) 
0.46** 
(0.23) 
Average institutional  
quality, 1984-2000 
 
 
1.22*** 
(0.35) 
 
 
1.31*** 
(0.43) 
1.18*** 
(0.41) 
 
 
 
1.43*** 
(0.41) 
1.37*** 
(0.41) 
Log average years of  
schooling, 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.38 
(0.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.78 
(0.58) 
Log average 
distance, 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.02 
(1.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
1.60 
(1.71) 
Average restrictions  
to capital mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.27** 
(0.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.60** 
(1.04) 
Countries 98 98 81 81 81  81 81 81 
R
2
 0.27 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.50  0.30 0.44 0.50 
B. 1970-2006 Period 
 Base Year 2005  Base Year 1996 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Log per capita initial  
GDP (2005 PPP$) 
1.65*** 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
1.79*** 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.40) 
0.31 
(0.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log per capita initial  
GDP (1996 PPP$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.74*** 
(0.22) 
-0.27 
(0.57) 
-0.12 
(0.35) 
Average institutional  
quality, 1984-2006 
 
 
1.82*** 
(0.48) 
 
 
1.92*** 
(0.55) 
1.80*** 
(0.55) 
 
 
 
1.75*** 
(0.54) 
1.56*** 
(0.53) 
Log average years of  
schooling, 1970-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.81 
(0.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.39 
(0.44) 
Log average 
distance, 1970-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.07 
(2.14) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
(1.59) 
Average restrictions  
to capital mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.80** 
(1.31) 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.40** 
(1.09) 
Countries 98 98 81 81 81  81 81 81 
R
2
 0.32 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.53  0.31 0.50 0.53 
Note: Dependent variable is average capital flows (the sum of FDI and foreign portfolio equity inflows, wherever the data are available for 
at least one of them) per capita expressed either in 1996 or in 2005 US dollars. Initial GDP is the first-observed GDP of a country within the 
corresponding sample period. The dependent variable and log per capita initial GDP consistently accord with the relevant base year. As the 
most part of Panel A (especially the first five models) is an exact replication of Alfaro et al. (2008), institutional quality considered in this 
panel is composed of eleven components out of twelve ICRG political risk indicators. The remaining ‘socioeconomic conditions’ 
component is also incorporated in Panel B as in this paper. The ‘years of schooling’ variable refers to average years of school attainment (at 
all levels) of the total population aged 25 and over and not 15 and over.  The results are robust to either measure of institutional quality and 
years of schooling. The base sample of 81 countries excludes any country that does not have data for all variables of interest. 
Heteroscedasticity robust (White-corrected) standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all estimations.  
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Table 3 Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 1970-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log per capita GDP  
(PPP$) in 1970 
0.372*** 
(0.077) 
0.187*** 
(0.060) 
 
 
0.225** 
(0.089) 
0.137* 
(0.073) 
 
 
Average institutional  
quality, 1984-2006 
 
 
0.446*** 
(0.062) 
0.348*** 
(0.060) 
 
 
0.410*** 
(0.065) 
0.366*** 
(0.060) 
Log average per capita GDP (PPP$), 
1970-2006  
 
 
 
 
0.276*** 
(0.071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log average years of  
schooling, 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.288** 
(0.134) 
0.060 
(0.079) 
0.007 
(0.056) 
Log average distance,  
1970-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.050 
(0.265) 
0.078 
(0.250) 
Average capital mobility  
restrictions, 1970-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.665 
(0.429) 
-0.625 
(0.395) 
Log per capita GDP  
(2005 US$) in 1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.220*** 
(0.072) 
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 
R
2
 0.259 0.592 0.620 0.335 0.669 0.707 
Note: Dependent variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per capita. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in 
all estimations.  
Table 4 Robustness Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita 
 
(1) 
1990–06 
(2) 
1970–06 
(3) 
1970–06 
(4) 
1970–06 
(5) 
1970–06 
(6) 
1994–06 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$) 
0.593*** 
(0.100) 
0.204*** 
(0.059) 
0.139** 
(0.057) 
0.177** 
(0.072) 
 
 
0.643*** 
(0.122) 
Average institutional 
quality 
0.508*** 
(0.126) 
0.404*** 
(0.064) 
0.423*** 
(0.050) 
0.448*** 
(0.084) 
0.410*** 
(0.073) 
0.563*** 
(0.133) 
Average corporate tax 
rate, 1999-06 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
     
Log average trade 
openness, 1970-06 
 
0.204 
(0.136) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log av. deposit money 
bank assets, 1970-06 
 
 
 
 
0.220** 
(0.103) 
 
 
 
 
 
Log average TFP  
growth, 1982-06 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
Log per capita GCF 
(2005 $US) in 1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.143*** 
(0.051) 
 
Malaria contagion risk in 
1994 
     
0.112 
(0.232) 
Countries 36 47 46 39 44 47 
R
2
 0.611 0.634 0.650 0.739 0.721 0.657 
Note: Dependent variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per capita. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in 
all estimations. Although the same restrictions imposed throughout all the estimations to ensure sample consistency, sample size may still 
vary due to data availability for some control variables.  
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Table 5 Robustness Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita 
 
(1) 
1990–06 
(2) 
1970–06 
(3) 
1990–06 
(4) 
1984–06 
(5) 
1984–06 
Log per capita initial 
GDP (PPP$)  
0.437*** 
(0.092) 
0.148** 
(0.066) 
0.429*** 
(0.114) 
  
Average institutional  
quality 
0.562*** 
(0.106) 
0.425*** 
(0.067) 
0.603*** 
(0.154) 
  
Average country risk,  
OECD, 1999-06 
-0.014 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
  
Log average Int'l  
voice traffic, 1970-06 
 
 
0.047 
(0.032) 
   
Average foreign bank  
asset share, 1990-97 
 
 
 
 
-0.124 
(0.511) 
  
Average institutional  
quality in 1984 
   
0.226*** 
(0.058) 
0.098* 
(0.058) 
Log per capita GDP  
(PPP$) in 1984 
   
 
 
0.550*** 
(0.114) 
Countries 47 46 41 45 45 
R
2
 0.640 0.603 0.613 0.177 0.449 
Note: See notes to Table 4.  
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Table 6 Instrumental Variable Regressions of Capital Inflows Per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Average institutional  
quality, 1984-2006 
0.849*** 
(0.285) 
2.377 
(21.261) 
0.935** 
(0.453) 
Log per capita GDP  
(PPP$) in 1970 
 
 
-0.854 
(11.525) 
 
 
Log European  
settler mortality 
 
 
 
 
0.016 
(0.117) 
Hausman RE Test (1-value) 0.397 0.996 0.649 
Hansen J-Test (1-value)   0.898 
Panel B First Stage for Average Institutional Quality in 1984-2006 
Log European  
settler mortality 
-0.189** 
(0.089) 
-0.010 
(0.122) 
-0.202* 
(0.102) 
Log per capita GDP  
(PPP$) in 1970 
 
 
0.529*** 
(0.193) 
 
 
British legal origin  
 
 
 
-0.275 
(0.289) 
English language  
 
 
 
0.720 
(0.633) 
R
2
 0.061 0.284 0.111 
Panel C Ordinary Least Squares 
Average institutional  
quality, 1984-2006 
0.528*** 
(0.072) 
0.428*** 
(0.086) 
0.507*** 
(0.069) 
Log per capita GDP  
(PPP$) in 1970 
 
 
0.188** 
(0.076) 
 
 
Log European  
settler mortality 
 
 
 
 
-0.065 
(0.050) 
Countries 39 39 39 
Note: In Panels A and C the response variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per capita whereas in B it is the 
composite index of institutional quality. Hausman regressor endogeneity (RE) test compares each model between Panels A and C whilst 
Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions –feasible only under (3)– assesses the validity of model instruments. For both tests given are /-
values. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Unreported constant included in all estimations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A Data  
Table A.1 Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Capital flows  Sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity flows (also 
known as total equity flows) expressed in per capita 
2005 $US, rescaled by 100 and averaged over 1970-
2006.   
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank.  
Initial GDP  Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted per capita 
GDP as of the model-corresponding initial year 
(mostly 1970), expressed in 2005 $US and in logs.   
 Heston et al. (2009), Penn 
Wold Table (PWT), Center 
for International 
Comparisons of Production, 
Income and Prices (CIC), 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Institutional 
quality 
 A composite index constructed by adding up annual 
scores of twelve sub-indices (government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in 
politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability,  bureaucratic 
quality), rescaled by 10 and averaged over 1984-2006. 
 International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), Political Risk 
Services Group (PRS, 2007). 
Years of 
schooling 
 Educational attainment of total population aged 25 and 
over in some levels (primary, secondary or tertiary) for 
some years, averaged over 1970-2000 and expressed in 
logs. 
 Barro and Lee (2001). 
Distance  Unilateral distance constructed as a GDP weighted 
average of the geodesic distances between capital city 
of a country and capital cities of all the other countries 
in the world, averaged over 1970-2006 and expressed 
in logs. 
 Centre d'Etudes Prospectives 
et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) and 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Capital 
mobility 
restrictions 
 Taking values between 0 (if no restriction) and 1 (if 
there is restriction), it is the mean of four dummy 
variables (multiple exchange rate practices, restrictions 
on current account transactions, barriers on capital 
account dealings, and surrender and repatriation 
requirements for export proceeds), averaged over 
1970-2005. 
 Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER), 
IMF. 
Corporate tax   A percentage rate levied on the company profits in a 
country, averaged over 1999-2006. 
 Corporate and Indirect Tax 
Rate Survey (various years), 
KPMG. 
Trade openness  Exports plus imports expressed as a percentage of 
GDP and in logs, averaged over 1970-2006.  
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank.  
  (continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Deposit money 
bank assets 
 Ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, averaged 
over 1970-2006 and expressed in logs.     
 Financial Development and 
Structure Database, Beck et 
al. (2010). 
TFP growth  The effect of technological change, efficiency 
improvements and immeasurable contribution of all 
inputs other than capital and labour which is estimated 
as the residual (i.e. Törnqvist index) by subtracting the 
sum of two-period average compensation share of 
capital and labour inputs weighted by their respective 
growth rates from the output growth rate. Usage of log 
level differences delivers the annual percentage TFP 
growth rates averaged over 1982-2006.   
 Total Economy Database, 
The Conference Board 
(2010). 
Initial GCF  Gross capital formation (GCF) per capita as of the 
model-corresponding initial year (mostly 1970) refers 
to outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the 
economy plus net changes in the level of inventories, 
expressed in 2005 $US and in logs. 
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Malaria   The proportion of a country’s population at risk of 
falciparum malaria infection as of 1994.  
 Sachs (2003).  
Country risk  Countries are assessed in terms of credit risk and 
classified into eight numerical categories between 0 
(lowest credit risk) and 7 (highest credit risk) using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. Data is 
averaged over 1999-2006.     
 OECD, 2010.  
International 
voice traffic 
 The sum of international incoming and outgoing 
telephone calls in minutes divided by the total 
population, averaged over 1970-2006 and expressed in 
logs.   
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank. 
Foreign bank 
asset share 
 Equals to the share of foreign bank assets in total 
banking sector assets, averaged over 1990-1997. 
 Financial Development and 
Structure Database, Beck et 
al. (2000). 
European 
settler mortality 
 The mortality rates of European settlers per 1,000 
mean strength in the 19th century, expressed in logs. 
 Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
British legal 
origin 
 A dummy variable indicating whether the origin of the 
current formal legal code of a country is British 
common law. 
 La Porta et al. (1997). 
English 
language 
 Fraction of the population speaking English as mother 
tongue. 
 Hall and Jones (1999). 
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Appendix B Samples 
 
Table B.1 Replication Samples 
Whole World Sample of 98 Countries  Base Sample of 81 Countries 
Albania Gabon Nicaragua  Argentina India Slovenia 
Algeria Gambia Niger  Australia Indonesia South Africa 
Angola Germany Nigeria  Austria Iran Spain 
Argentina Ghana Norway  Bangladesh Israel Sweden 
Armenia Greece Oman  Bolivia Italy T. Tobago 
Australia Guatemala Pakistan  Brazil Jamaica Tunisia 
Austria Guinea Panama  Bulgaria Japan Turkey 
Azerbaijan Guyana P. N. Guinea  Cameroon Jordan Uganda 
Bangladesh Haiti Paraguay  Canada Kenya Ukraine 
Belarus Honduras Peru  Chile Korea Rep. UK 
Bolivia Hungary Philippines  Colombia Latvia US 
Brazil India Portugal  Congo Rep. Lithuania Uruguay 
Bulgaria Indonesia Russian Fed.  Costa Rica Malaysia Vietnam 
Burkina Faso Iran Saudi Arabia  Croatia Mali Zambia 
Cameroon Israel Senegal  Cyprus Mexico Zimbabwe 
Canada Italy Sierra Leone  Czech Rep. Morocco  
Chile Jamaica Singapore  Denmark Mozambique  
Colombia Japan Slovenia  Dominican Rep. Netherlands  
Congo Rep. Jordan South Africa  Ecuador New Zealand  
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Spain  Egypt Nicaragua  
Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Sweden  El Salvador Niger  
Croatia Korea Rep. T. Tobago  Estonia Norway  
Cyprus Latvia Tunisia  Finland Pakistan  
Czech Rep. Lithuania Turkey  France Panama  
Denmark Madagascar Uganda  Gambia P. N. Guinea  
Dominican Rep. Malaysia Ukraine  Germany Paraguay  
Ecuador Mali UK  Ghana Peru  
Egypt Mexico US  Greece Philippines  
El Salvador Morocco Uruguay  Guatemala Portugal  
Estonia Mozambique Vietnam  Guyana Russian Fed.  
Ethiopia Namibia Zambia  Haiti Senegal  
Finland Netherlands Zimbabwe  Honduras Sierra Leone  
France New Zealand   Hungary Singapore  
Note: Unlike what Alfaro et al. (2008) report in their Appendix B, Belarus drops from the base sample due to schooling data unavailability 
but Vietnam remains instead. 
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Table B.2 Developing Country Samples 
Baseline Sample  IV Regressions Sample 
Algeria Kenya  Algeria Mexico 
Argentina Malawi  Argentina Nicaragua 
Bangladesh Malaysia  Bangladesh Niger 
Bolivia Mali  Bolivia Pakistan 
Botswana Mexico  Brazil Panama 
Brazil Nicaragua  Cameroon Papua New Guinea 
Bulgaria Niger  Chile Paraguay 
Cameroon Pakistan  China Peru 
Chile Panama  Colombia Senegal 
China Papua New Guinea  Costa Rica South Africa 
Colombia Paraguay  Dominican Republic Sri Lanka 
Costa Rica Peru  Ecuador Thailand 
Dominican Republic Philippines  Egypt Tunisia 
Ecuador Senegal  El Salvador Uruguay 
Egypt South Africa  Ghana Venezuela 
El Salvador Sri Lanka  Guatemala  
Ghana Thailand  Guyana  
Guatemala Tunisia  Honduras  
Guyana Turkey  India  
Honduras Uruguay  Indonesia  
India Venezuela  Jamaica  
Indonesia Zambia  Kenya  
Jamaica Zimbabwe  Malaysia  
Jordan   Mali  
 
